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10.1080/10242690701574480Defence and Peace Economics24-2694 (print)/1476-8267 (online)Original Articl2 07Taylor & Francis0Professor KjellHauskenkj l .h usken@uis.noA two-period exchange model is developed where production decisions in the first period determine the amount of 
resources available in the second period. Each agent allocates resources to defend its production and attack the 
production of the other agent. Production, conflict and exchange occur simultaneously in a dynamic model. This 
extends earlier exchange models, which are static and preclude defense and appropriation. The agents jointly 
determine price through their export decisions. Upon introducing exchange endogenously, raiding in the first 
relative to the second period decreases with growth, appropriation cost, and when the future becomes more 
important, and increases with defense cost, production cost, and usability of appropriation. Increasing the usability 
of appropriation and defense cost causes a transition from pure exchange via joint exchange and raiding to pure 
raiding. This implies that agents gradually substitute from defense to appropriation, they exchange less, and 
utility decreases. Utility isoquants in a usability of appropriation versus discount factor diagram are concavely 
increasing for joint exchange and raiding, and can be convexly decreasing for pure raiding. Cobb–Douglas utilities 
are assumed. The results are confirmed with CES utilities.
Keywords: production; exchange; trade; appropriation; defense; mutual raiding; dynamics; growth; discounting; 
predation; attack
INTRODUCTION
Among many economists and classical liberals, exchange is considered important not just for
the direct material benefits it gives but also for the possible reduction in frictions among poten-
tial adversaries that it may induce. Partly in this tradition, this article analyzes how exchange
may reduce conflict in a dynamic setting. It departs from a similar setting that Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996a) have examined but which did not take exchange into account. With the
approach in this article, the presence of exchange reverses some of the results regarding the
effect of the discount factor. Further comparative static analyses are also performed.
Determining whether the shadow of the future induces or harms cooperation or other kinds 
of behavior is essential. On the one hand, folk theorem (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986) 
arguments, which apply for infinitely repeated games, suggest the possibility of 
cooperation in long-term relationships. On the other hand, Skaperdas and Syropoulos 
(1996a) demonstrate, in a two-period conflict model,  how increased importance of the
future may harm cooperation. Different conceptualizations of strategic interaction, 
intertemporal linkage, and strategy sets cause different results. The two-person prisoner’s 
dilemma assumes the two strategies, co-operation versus defection, with four combinations 
of utilities. Game repetition may cause temporary benefits from defecting today to be 
outweighed by defection by the other agent in the future (Axelrod, 1984). In contrast, 
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996a) conceptualize a game where each agent has a resource 
that can be allocated into production versus arms. A larger share of the total product is 
given to the agent investing more in arms.
Uncritical use of the folk theorem1 may induce framing effects and blind less cautious users 
to important dimensions that are relevant for determining how different strategies impact 
utilities dependent on the shadow of the future. Similarly, uncritically assuming that 
investment in arms today causes benefits tomorrow is unwarranted. To enhance our 
insight into these matters, this article introduces exchange endogenously as a possible 
strategy in addition to production and raiding, divided into appropriation and defense.2 
We want to find out whether allowing agents to exchange goods voluntarily, in 
addition to fighting for goods, gives different results.
Throughout history, mankind has engaged in mutual raiding and voluntary exchange to 
acquire desired goods. The relative emphasis of each activity has changed back and forth, 
although scholarly work has typically analyzed each activity in separation. Pure market 
exchange may be supplemented by, or grow out of, activities such as war, piracy, corruption, 
extortion, crime, plundering, theft – referred to as mutual raiding. Exchange has a long 
tradition in economics. Appropriation and defense of productive resources, without 
reciprocal exchange, has also been analyzed. A few authors attempt to integrate production, 
exchange, and appropriation.3 This article is the first to provide a dynamic analysis that 
integrates production, exchange, appropriation, and defense. The equilibrium balance 
between raiding and exchange depends on six parameters; namely, the costs of 
production, appropriation, defense, the usability of appropriation, the discount factor, and a 
growth factor.
Most contest models let appropriated goods be equally valuable to the appropriator and the 
defender. In practice, however, as Grossman and Kim (1995, p. 1279) point out, ‘predation 
involves violence and destruction,’ appropriated goods may deteriorate ‘during shipment or a 
predator’s gain needs to be processed to be usable.’ Further, agents generally value 
differently goods appropriated from others and goods they produce or possess themselves. 
Distinguishing between costs of appropriation and defense allows for tuning these activities 
to be inferior or superior to each other, or equally costly. Clausewitz (1832, 6.1.2) argues 
for the ‘superiority of defense over attack.’ ‘The defender enjoys optimum lines of 
communication and retreat, and can choose the place for battle.’ In contrast, the 
attacker enjoys ‘initial surprise, and the benefit of choosing the time, the nature, and the 
form of the attack.’ Rapid world changes present scenarios where both appropriation and 
1 The folk theorem asserts that any individually rational outcome can arise as a Nash equilibrium in infinitely
repeated games with sufficiently little discounting. Defining V* as ‘the set of individually rational payoffs,’ the Folk
Theorem states: ‘For any (v1,…,vn)∈V*, if players discount the future sufficiently little, there exists a Nash
equilibrium of the infinitely repeated game where, for all i, player i’s average payoff is vi’ (Fudenberg and Maskin,
1986, p. 537).
2 
‘Appropriation’ and ‘defense’ are metaphors that need not involve actual violence. They refer to rent-seeking
manoeuvres for licenses and monopoly privileges, commercial efforts to raise rivals’ costs, strikes and lockouts,
litigation, etc.
3 Anderton (1999), Anderton and Anderton (1997), Anderton et al. (1999), Hausken (2004), Rider (1993, 1999),
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996b, 2001). Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2002) show that exchange may be inefficient
when property rights are insecure, due to large enforcement costs. This may cause limited settlement without
exchange. Conversely, more secure property rights may allow for exchange. Anderson and Marcouiller (1997) allow
predation and production and show that autarky, insecure exchange, and secure exchange may occur. Secure
exchange is supported only in a narrow range of security parameter values. Large poor countries are harmed by
increased security.
defense are superior to each other.4 The cost of production affects both relative investments 
in production versus raiding, and affects the utilities in each of two periods differently due 
to the nature of intertemporal linkage.
This article lets two agents (individuals, groups, companies, nations) specialize in 
producing one good each, while also attaching utility to the other good. The two agents 
attempt to appropriate and defend their production. At the same time, they have the 
opportunity to exchange goods voluntarily. Only that part of an agent’s production that 
has been successfully defended can be exported. In return, the agent receives import 
which is a part of the other agent’s production that has been successfully defended by the 
other agent. The terms of exchange are such that each agent chooses his appropriation, 
defense, and export, taking the other agent’s appropriation, defense, and export (which is 
the first agent’s import) as given. We assume Cobb–Douglas utilities, and test the 
robustness of results through CES utilities. Their resource in each of two periods is 
allocated between production, appropriation, and defense, allowing for exchange. 
Exchange and raiding occurs through time in a two-period model with intertemporal 
linkage. Each agent’s resource in the second period depends on his production in the first 
period multiplied by a growth factor. Furthermore, an agent’s total utility equals his first 
period utility plus a discount factor multiplied by his second period utility. The growth 
and discount factors together form the shadow of the future.
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996a) let two agents fight over joint production, assuming a
Cobb–Douglas production function and a logistic contest success function. Introducing
exchange into joint production is not straightforward since output has to be made disjoint
before the two agents can exchange. Introducing exchange, and Cobb-Douglas utilities for the
two goods exchanged, this article enables analytical tractability by assuming a production
function that is linear in effort and a ratio contest success function.5 Despite the dissimilarities,
we nevertheless make some comparisons with Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a) model
since they offer results of a general nature. For example, they find that increasing the shadow
of the future decreases efficiency, may increase fighting, and they find that the ratio of utilities
in the first and second periods decreases when growth increases. It is of interest to determine
to what extent such findings depend on the specific model chosen, and whether exchange
generates different results.
The relationship between exchange and conflict has been disputed for centuries. Commer-
cial liberalists claim that exchange inhibits conflict, while alternative views are that exchange
promotes belligerence or is unrelated, for example, to interstate disputes.6 Reuveny (2001,
p. 131) suggests a ‘need for richer, more microfounded models,’ which this article intends to
provide.
The next section presents the two-period Cobb–Douglas model. The section after solves the
model. The fourth section analyzes the results and presents nine properties. The fifth section
illustrates graphically while the sixth section tests the robustness of the results by applying the
CES model. The seventh section concludes.
4 See Hirshleifer (2000, pp. 784–787) for discussions of offense versus defense.
5 Differentiation to determine the first order conditions when using the logistic contest success function gives
logarithms which, combined with the exponential Cobb–Douglas parameter, prevents analytical tractability. Fortu-
nately, the ratio contest success function is analytically tractable and is, furthermore, more commonly used. See
Hirshleifer (1989) for a comparison of the two functions, Skaperdas (1996) for an axiomatization, and Tullock
(1980) for an early use of the ratio form in rent seeking.
6 See Polachek (1980), Anderton and Carter (2001), Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000), Morrow (1999).
THE TWO-PERIOD COBB–DOUGLAS MODEL
Assume a budget constraint for a resource Ri1 (e.g. a capital good, or labor) which for agent i
in period 1 is divided into productive effort Ei1 (designed to generate good i from resources
currently controlled), appropriative effort Fi1 (aimed at acquiring the other agent’s good at the
expense of the other agent), and defensive effort Di1 (aimed at repelling the other agent as he
attempts to acquire one’s own good). This gives: 
where ai,bi,ci are unit conversion costs of transforming resources into productive, appropria-
tive, and defensive effort, respectively. Assume a simple production function Ei1 where output
produced equals effort Ei1 invested, that is:7 
The agents have equivalent Cobb–Douglas preferences for the two productions. The article
can also be developed assuming CES preferences (see the sixth section). To ensure analytical
tractability, they engage in division of labor by producing one good each, which is a special
case of an Edgeworth box where each agent is endowed with one of the two goods. Rider
(1999) provides an alternative exchange model where each agent produces one good.
Although each agent produces only one good, he has two ways of acquiring the other good
(i.e. exchange and appropriation), which allows for a rich analysis. Using the ratio formula as
our contest success function (Hirshleifer, 1995; Skaperdas, 1996; Tullock, 1980), let agent 1
defend an object with D11, and agent 2 appropriate the object with F21. Agent 1 receives a
fraction D11/(D11 + F21), and agent 2 receives the remaining fraction F21/(D11 + F21).
Hausken (2004) and Rider (1999) assume that production can be appropriated, while
Anderton et al. (1999) and Anderton (1999) assume in a predator-prey model that the resource
holding of the Defender is vulnerable to appropriation. This article assumes that the agents
defend and appropriate each other’s productions E11 and E21.8 Conflict is an ever-present
phenomenon. The agents contemplate whether exchange can emerge endogenously despite
conflict. Agent 1 exports X11 and imports X21, and conversely for agent 2. Their von Neumann
and Morgenstern utilities U1 and U2 in the first period are: 
7 Not distinguishing between offense and defense, Hirshleifer (1995, p. 31) presents a similar production function
where, in our notation, Ei1 is raised to the parameter h. Our analysis sets h=1 to ensure analytical tractability. The
article can also be developed for general h, for example h<1 which gives a production function with diminishing
returns. Such a more general analysis gives unreasonably complex first-order conditions that cannot be solved
analytically, although the phenomenon can be analyzed computationally with simulations.
8 Hausken (2003, pp. 33–36) classifies the 78 possible models for how one or several of the five objects (produc-
tion, resources, consumption goods, exports, and imports) can be set under attack. Raiding production means that
any part of the successfully defended production can be exchanged. More detrimentally, raiding resources gives a
fraction, typically less than one, of successfully defended resources to be divided between production, appropriation,
and defense, before exchange can occur. Hence, Hausken (2003) finds that raiding resources tends to increase the
prevalence of raiding. Possessing more resources is advantageous with low usability of appropriated resources and
superiority of defense over attack, especially when resources rather than production are raided.
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where α is the relative preference parameter for good 1 for both agents, and P21 is an interior
terms-of-exchange price denoting the price of good 2 in terms of good 1 in the first period.
Equation (3) states that the two agents attempt to appropriate and defend their production.
At the same time they have the opportunity to exchange goods voluntarily. No fraction of the
production is exempt from appropriation. Only that part of an agent’s production that has been
successfully defended can be exported. In return, the agent receives an import which is a part
of the other agent’s production that has been successfully defended by the other agent. Without
the possibility of exchange, which means that we exogenously set X11=X21=X2=X12=0,
equation (3) reduces to a pure conflict model. One objective of this article is to determine the
conditions under which the agents endogenously choose positive X11,X21,X2,X12.
The price equation P21=X11/X21 means that as agent 1 exports more (X11 increases), the price
of good 1 in terms of good 2, that is 1/P21, decreases. That is, as agent 1 exports more, the price
of those exports decreases. A conventional supply-demand consideration explains this. As good
1 becomes more readily available for agent 2, the price of good 1 decreases. Despite such a
reduction in the price of agent 1’s exports, we show the conditions under which agent 1 is
willing to increase his exports voluntarily. One essential parameter is β, which is the usability
or non-destruction parameter denoting that fraction of the appropriated production that the
appropriating agent can make use of in the same manner as his own production (that is, the
appropriator gains a fraction β of what the defender loses).9 Agent i’s free choice variables in
the first period are F11,D11,X11, and similarly F21,D21,X21 for agent 2, determined endogenously.
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996a, p. 361) ‘think that there are few societies where the 
resources of individual agents are not positively related to their past incomes or wealth.’ They 
accordingly assume that the second period resource is proportional to the first period payoff 
which is in units of output.10 They state that the proportionality growth ‘parameter γ can be 
thought to reflect investment choices in period 1, which for simplicity are effectively 
assumed to be a constant fraction of period 1 payoffs.’ Letting the second period resource be 
proportional to the first period resource Ri1 is not interesting since that provides no linkage 
between the two periods. That would render the discount factor δ irrelevant, and would give 
equivalent solutions for the two periods, merely substituting the resource Ri1 in the first 
period solution with γRi2 in the second period solution. To capture the logic of the linkage 
between the two periods, the second period resource must be proportional to the first period 
resource where the proportion is endogenous to the decisions made in the first period. We 
accordingly offer a defense burden story of diminished growth. The greater diversion of 
resources relative to the first period resource Ri1, the smaller is the growth of the resource 
from the first to the second period.11 The burden of appropriation and defense in the first 
period is reflected by the expen-diture biFi1 for appropriation and the expenditure ciDi1 for 
defense. Subtracting these two expenditures from the first period resource Ri1, to reflect the 
diversion of resources, gives an expression that is proportional to the first period production 
expressed in equation (2). Hence, we let the second period resource be proportional to the 
first period production. That provides linkage between the two periods so that the shadow of 
the future can be assessed. Accordingly, the second period resource for agent i is γEi1, where 
γ is a growth parameter and Ei1 is agent i’s first period production determined by equation 
(2). Production Ei1 generated in the first period is a good indicator of growth. It allows an 
economy to grow in the second period. This is not the case for resources converted into 
appropriation and defense, which determine how much can be consumed in the first 
period.12 
9 We require Fi1≥0 and Di1≥ε>0, where ε is arbitrarily small but positive, assuming ci<∞. The slightly different
bounds are necessary to avoid ‘0/0’ ratios in equation (3), which happens when the agents prefer pure exchange. Of
course, we explicitly test for corner solutions where Fi1=0 or Di1=ε.
10 Our utilities in equation (3) capture consumption goods.
11 I thank an anonymous referee of this journal for this suggestion.
Analogously to equation (2), the agents’ production function Ei2 for the second period is: 
where Fi2 and Di2 are the appropriative and defensive efforts by agent i in the second period.
The agents’ utilities V1 and V2 in the second period are: 
where agent 1 exports X12 and imports X22, and conversely for agent 2. P22 is the price of good
2 in terms of good 1 in the second period. With a discount factor δ, agent i’s total utility Wi
over the two periods is: 
SOLVING THE MODEL
Assuming a subgame perfect equilibrium, we first solve for equilibrium in the second period,
conditional on the resources γE1i available in the second period. We thereafter find the optimal
solution in the first period, taking into account that the agents’ choices in the second period
must be in equilibrium. Agent i has the three free choice variables Fij,Dij,Xij in period j. For
two agents and two periods this gives the 12 FOCs: 
Most exchange models assume that the agents are price takers and a Walrasian equilibrium 
emerges as the price that balances exchange offers (see for example Kreps, 1990, for a 
treatment of classical exchange). In bilateral monopoly treatments of exchange, the price is 
indeterminate. As problematic as the Walrasian equilibrium may be, it gives rise to a 
determinate price. In most exchange models, a price equation is necessary to close the 
model. This suggests a need for two exchange balance equations (one for each period) in 
addition to the 12 FOCs listed in equation (7).13 
12 Another possibility is to let the second period resource be proportional to that portion of the first period produc-
tion that is successfully defended, but that would be inappropriate since some of the production of the other agent is
also appropriated. A further possibility is to let the second period resource be proportional to the portion of the first
period production that is successfully defended, plus the portion of the first period production of the other agent that
is successfully appropriated. That possibility gives first-order conditions that can be solved computationally, but
without analytical solutions. A final possibility is to let the second-period resource be proportional to the first-period
utility, so that the second-period resource for agent i is γUi. That interpretation can also be given a defense burden
story of diminished growth. The argument would then be that future resources depend on how well one has done in
the past in terms of actual consumption or utility which determines fitness in the future. However, in many cases
when something is consumed, the good that is consumed does not exist any more. Think for example of food, leisure
activities, travel, or wasteful consumption. It is not clear that such consumption, which then does not exist any more,
shall determine the availability of future resources. The author has analyzed this case. The results are qualitatively
similar to the results in this article, and are available from the author upon request.
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To see that the exchange balance equations are already built into the mathematics in this 
model, we reason as follows. The price in the first period is P21=X11/X21. Since X11 and 
X21 are free choice variables determined by the 12 FOCs in equa-tion (7), P21 is a dependent 
variable that follows from X11 and X21. This means that the agents jointly control the price. 
No factors external to the agents control the price. Also, no agent unilaterally controls the 
price. Agent 1 controls his export X11 and agent 2 controls his export X21. The terms of 
exchange are such that each agent chooses his appropriation, defense, and export optimally 
taking the other agent’s appropriation, defense, and export (which is the first agent’s import) 
as given. More specifically, when agent 1 chooses X11 optimally, he takes X21 as given. 
Together, since agent 1 chooses X11 and agent 2 chooses X21, the two agents jointly choose 
the first period price P21=X11/X21. The second period price is analogously defined as 
P22=X12/X22 where agent 1 controls his export X12 and agent 2 controls his export X22. In other 
words, the terms of exchange or international price P21 and P22 is implicitly determined by the 
choices of X11, X21, X12, X22. That the prices are not taken as given, but depend on both agents’ 
free choice variables, is realistic in a duopoly. Both agents influence the price. In the 
optimization problem agent 1 replaces X21 with X11/P21 and replaces X22 with X12/P22 in 
equations (3) and (4). After these two replacements, however, the prices P21 and P22 are 
taken as given in the optimization. The four last FOCs in equation (7) can be written as: 
For the symmetric case Fij=Fj, Dij=Dj, Xij=Xj, Wi=W, Ri1=R, ai=a, bi=b, ci=c, and α=1/2 so that
the agents have equal preferences for the two goods, the solution of equation (7) when
exchange occurs (Xj > 0), which means joint exchange and raiding, is: 
13 I thank an anonymous referee for these formulations and for requesting an elaboration of how the exchange
balance equations are built into the mathematics.
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When exchange does not occur (Xj = 0), which means pure raiding, the special case γ2δ + aγ 
= 2a2, one example of which is a=δ=γ=1, has proven possible to solve, giving: 
Joint exchange and raiding occurs in both periods when b > cβ2, which means that the defense
cannot be too costly compared with appropriation (b / β2 > c), or, for the case that the defense
is more costly than appropriation, that the appropriated production is less valuable to the
appropriator than to the defender) . Conversely, pure raiding occurs when b ≤ cβ2.
Provided that β>0, equation (9) implies for the symmetric case that pure exchange is impossi-
ble and appropriation and defense are guaranteed in both periods. This stands in contrast to
Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a) model, which gives no investment in arms in any of the
two periods if the growth factor γ is below a certain value.
Let us determine the efficient utility Wie for the non-symmetric case when there is no
appropriation and no defense. Inserting Fij=0 and Dij=ε into equation (6), applying equations
(2)–(5) and (8) gives: 
where the efficiency ei is the ratio of the utilities with and without appropriation and defense.
Wie is naturally independent of β. For the symmetric case, equation (11) simplifies to: 
For joint exchange and raiding the efficiency e is independent of δ, γ, and the cost a of
production. β=0 makes appropriation valueless, causing pure exchange and efficiency e=1.
The efficiency decreases convexly in β, giving e = (b + c)/(b + 3c) when β=1.
The ratio between the first period and second period utilities is: 
which increases in a and decreases in γ. For joint exchange and raiding, U/V increases in β,b,c.
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In order to determine utility isoquants, solving the utility W in equation (9) with respect to
the discount factor δ = δ ′ for joint exchange and raiding when b > cβ2 gives: 
δ decreases convexly in γ and increases concavely in β. The utility W increases in δ and γ, as
the future becomes more important or growth increases. Hence the utility isoquants in a growth
factor γ versus discount factor δ diagram are convexly decreasing throughout the first quadrant,
in contrast to Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a, p. 369) ‘iso-efficiency contours’. Assuming
the growth factor γ is above a certain value so that raiding occurs, their contours are vertical
for large discount factors δ (raiding only in the first period), convex for intermediate δ (raiding
in both periods), and concave in the transition to small δ (raiding only in the second period).
As appropriation becomes more usable in equation (9), fewer resources are allocated to
production. Hence, the utility W decreases convexly in β. This means that a higher discount
factor δ is needed to maintain the same utility as β increases. Hence, for joint exchange and
raiding the utility isoquants are concavely increasing in a usability of appropriation β versus
discount factor δ diagram.
Solving the utility W in equation (10) with respect to δ=δ″ for pure raiding when b ≤ cβ2
and γ2δ + aγ = 2a2 gives: 
δ decreases convexly in both γ and β. The utility isoquants in a growth factor γ versus 
discount factor δ diagram are convexly decreasing in both equations (14) and (15) since 
higher emphasis on the future and growth are beneficial for both joint exchange and raiding, 
and for pure raiding. In equation (9), F1 and F2 increase in β, and W decreases convexly in β. 
In equation (10), in contrast, F1,F2,D1,D2 are independent of β. The reason is the nature of 
the Cobb–Douglas utility where an agent also needs the other agent’s good. In equation (10), 
the agents endogenously choose pure raiding without exchange to obtain the other good. 
Since increasing β does not cause more allocation to appropriation and defense, but instead 
causes the appropriation to be more usable, the utility W in equation (10) increases in β, and 
it increases concavely due to β . Consequently, a lower emphasis δ on the future is sufficient 
to maintain the same utility as β increases. Hence, for pure raiding the utility isoquants are 
convexly decreasing in a usability of appropriation β versus discount factor δ diagram.
ANALYZING THE RESULTS
This section confines attention to joint exchange and raiding where b > cβ2, acknowledging
that pure raiding where b ≤ cβ2 has been analyzed in earlier literature. The proofs of Properties
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1–8 follow from differentiating equations (9) and (12), and determining the signs of the 
derivatives. The proof of Property 9 follows from equation (13).
Property 1
First, increasing the shadow of the future decreases appropriation and defense, and increases 
exchange, in the first period. Strikingly, this result is the opposite of Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos’ (1996a) result in a model allowing fighting and production, but not exchange. 
Introducing exchange endogenously as a possible strategy in addition to fighting 
(appropriation and defense) and production, reverses the result when only fighting and 
production are possible. Second, increasing the shadow of the future increases appropriation, 
defense, and exchange, in the second period. The incentive to constrain appropriation and 
defense is not the same in the second period as in the first period. Third, increasing the 
shadow of the future increases all the four utilities U,V,W,We since the pie gets enlarged. 
Fourth, increasing the shadow of the future has no impact on the efficiency e since the term a 
+ δγ is equivalently present in equations (9) and (12). This contrasts with Skaperdas and 
Syropoulos’ (1996a) finding that increasing the shadow of the future decreases efficiency. 
The reason is the first point where the shadow of the future in their model increases 
investment in arms today.
Property 2
Properties 1 and 2 reveal the same signs for the derivatives with respect to δ and γ. Inspecting
equation (9) reveals that δ and γ always occur multiplicatively as γδ in F1,D1,X1. When located
in the first period, increasing the shadow δ of the future and increasing the growth γ in
resources from the first to the second period have the same impact. A high (low) value for δ
may compensate for a low (high) value for g, and vice versa. If δ and γ are both low or both
high, their joint impact reinforces each other. The parameters δ and γ occur multiplicatively as
γδ once in the numerator and once in the denominator of F2,D2,X2. Additionally, γ occurs alone
as a proportionality factor in F2,D2,X2. The reason is that discounting occurs proportionally
with the second period utility V as viewed from the first period, but not proportionally as
viewed from the second period. In equation (5), V depends on δ and γ as F2,D2,X2 do since
α=1/2 and the ratios are dimensionless. This is clarified by equation (6) where δ is multiplied
by the second period utility V and added to U to yield the total utility W. Hence, δ and γ occur
multiplicatively as γδ in W in equation (9).
Property 3
Of all the parameters, b has the most straightforward impact when operating equivalently
on both agents. The derivatives are the same as for δ and γ except that the second period
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appropriation and defense also decrease in b, and the impact on We and e differs. That
is, increasing the cost b of appropriation has the universally beneficial effect of reducing
appropriation and defense in both periods, increasing exchange in both periods,
increasing all utilities except We (which is not influenced by b), which thus increases the
efficiency e.
Property 4
The three parameters c,a,β are the most detrimental to increase, although with different
impacts. Increasing the cost c of defense increases appropriation in both periods, decreases
defense and exchange in both periods, decreases all utilities except We (which is not influenced
by c), and decreases efficiency.
Property 5
As the cost a of production increases, agents switch from production to raiding in the first
period, as they would in a one-shot game. They also do so in the second period, but raiding in
the second period decreases in a since reduced production in the first period causes fewer
resources to be available for conversion into raiding and production in the second period.
Hence, appropriation and defense increase in a in the first period, and decrease in a in the
second period. All utilities decrease in a. Increased raiding in the first period compensates for
reduced raiding in the second period, causing a to have no impact on the efficiency e, where
a operates equivalently in W and We.
Property 6
Increasing the usability β of appropriation naturally increases appropriation in both periods,
and it increases the defense in the first period. This causes the first period utility derivative
∂U / ∂β to be positive or negative, but ∂2U / ∂β2 > 0 is positive. Hence, U is U-shaped.
Viewing the first period in isolation, an intermediate β is most detrimental on the utility U.
When β is increased above this detrimental level, appropriation becomes more usable. This
causes appropriation and defense to increase, and exchange to decrease. The second period
defense derivative ∂D2 / ∂β can be positive or negative, but ∂2D2 / ∂β2 < 0 is negative.
Hence, D2 is inverse U-shaped. The defenses in both periods are concave. Agents substitute
from defense to appropriation when appropriation becomes more usable, illustrated with the
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ratio Dj / Fj = b/(cβ) in equation (9). The total utility W and efficiency e decrease convexly 
in β.
Property 7
Introducing exchange endogenously as a possible strategy in addition to fighting 
(appropriation and defense) and production, induces agents to restrain their appropriation F1 
and defense D1 in the first period, relative to F2 and D2 in the second period, when the 
parameters δ,γ,b increase (i.e. when the future becomes more important), when there is 
growth, and when the cost of appropriation increases. They allocate resources to production 
and engage in exchange rather than costly raiding to equip themselves well with resources for 
the second period. This stands in contrast to Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a) result that 
increasing the shadow of the future may increase fighting. Conversely, the ratios F1/F1=D1/
D2 increase in c,a,β (i.e. when the cost of defense, or the cost of production, or the usability 
of appropriation increases).
Property 8
The importance δ of the future has no impact on the exchange X1 in the first period relative to
X2 in the second period. The other five parameters γ,b,c,a,β have the same impact on X1/X2 as
on F1/F1=D1/D2.
Property 9
U/V > 1 when γ < a(b + cβ(2 + β))/(b + cβ) which simplifies to γ < a when β=0 and γ < a(b +
3c)/(b + c) when β=1
Applying equation (13), the ratio U/V of utilities in the first and second periods first decreases
in γ, which causes benefit in the second period. This result is also found by Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996a, p. 370). Second, U/V increases in the cost a of production. The reason is
that the first period production in equation (2) is determined by dividing the resource R
(deducting appropriation and defense) with a, while the second period production in equation
(4) is determined by dividing the resource γEi1 (deducting appropriation and defense) with a,
with the added impact that U decreases in a. Increasing a is thus more detrimental for the
second period utility than for the first period utility. Third, the term (b + cβ(2 + β))/(b + cβ)
increases from 1 to (b + 3c)/(b + c) as β increases from 0 to 1. While β=0 causes pure exchange
in both periods, and β=1 causes joint exchange and raiding when b > c, and pure raiding when
b ≤ c, in both periods, β=1 is more detrimental for the second period utility since the resource
γEi1 available in the second period gets reduced by the first period raiding. That is, the high
usability β of appropriation causes costly raiding in the second period, while the agents impose
restraints on their raiding in the first period due to the nature of time dependence from the first
to the second period.
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GRAPHIC ILLUSTRATIONS
Standardizing the variables by dividing with the resource Ri1 or R, 
the dependence on the usability β of appropriation is shown in Figure 1 where, a=b=δ=γ=1,
c=2, illustrating Property 6. Joint exchange and raiding occurs when , and pure raid-
ing orrurs when . The growth γ=1 and cost a=1 of production imply, due to equations
(2) and (4), that the resource γEi1 available in the second period is lower than the resource R
available in the first period. Despite this, the second period appropriation f2 and defense d2 are
higher than the first period appropriation f1 and defense d1. Conversely, the second period
exchange x2 is lower than the first period exchange x1.
FIGURE 1 Variables as functions of the usability β of appropriation. Division by 2 in w/2 and e/2 are for scaling purposes, a=b=δ=γ=1, c=2.Figure 2 shows the dependence on the cost c of defense. The parameters are as in Figure 1,
although β=1, and γ has been doubled to γ=2 to illustrate substantial increase for f2 and d2 in
the second period. Joint exchange and raiding occurs when c < 1, and pure raiding occurs when
c ≥ 1, solved numerically since γ2δ + aγ ≠ 2a2. The curves exemplify Property 4.
FIGURE 2 Variables as functions of the unit defense cost c, a=b=δ=β=1, γ=2.Figure 3 shows the convexly decreasing utility isoquants in a growth factor γ versus
discount factor δ diagram where a=b=1, c=2, β=0.6, which satisfies b > cβ2 ensuring joint
exchange and raiding. Figure 4 shows the utility isoquants in a usability of appropriation β
versus discount factor δ diagram where a=b=γ=1, c=2, giving a concave increase for joint
exchange and raiding when , and a convex decrease for pure raiding when .
FIGURE 3 Utility isoquants in a growth factor γ versus discount factor δ diagram, a=b=1, c=2, β=0.6.4 usability of appropriation β versus discount factor δ diagram, a=b=γ=1, c=2.Symmetry facilitates exchange more easily than asymmetry (Hausken, 2004). Figure 5 tests 
the sensitivity to symmetry by equipping the agents with different resources R11 and R21. The 
FOCs in equation (7) are applied to determine the variables as functions of the resource ratio 
R11/R21, a1=a2=b1=b2=c1=c2=δ=γ=1, α=β=1/2, where w and e are the average utilities and 
efficiencies. All variables except the prices and efficiencies are, according to equation (16), 
divided by R11 for agent 1 and R21 for agent 2. The convexly decreasing curve proportional to 
y=1/(R11/R21), where y is measured along the vertical axis, demarcates whether the absolute 
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FIGURE 1 Variables as functions of the usability β of appropriation. Division by 2 in w/2 and e/2 are for scaling 
purposes, a=b=δ=γ=1, c=2.
for agent 1 increases or decreases in R11/R21. Figure 5(a) shows that the agent receiving more
resources increases his appropriation and decreases his defense in relative terms. d1j decreases
less than proportional to y=1/(R11/R21), so D1j increases in absolute terms. The agent receiving
fewer resources increases his appropriation considerably, consistently with Hirshleifer’s
(1991) paradox of power, and also increases his defense. The behavioral trends are the same
in both periods. Figure 5(b) shows that agent 1’s export x1j =X1j/R11 decreases moderately,
which means that X1j increases, while agent 2’s export x2j =X2j/R21 decreases more, as R11/R21
increases. The prices P2j of good 2 in terms of good 1 increases in R11/R21, which reflects that
agent 1’s high resource R11 translates into higher production of good 1, causing good 1 to be
more readily available and cheaper than the scarce expensive good 2. The utility w1=W1/R11
for agent 1 decreases in R11/R21, while W1 increases slightly, and w2=W2/R21 for agent 2 is
inverse U shaped. The average utility w=(w1+w2)/2 and efficiency e decrease in R11/R21, as
asymmetry causes more inefficient appropriation and defense.
FIGURE 5 (a) Variables as functions of the resource ratio R11/R21, a1=a2=b1=b2=c1=c2=δ=γ=1, α=β=1/2.b
FIGURE 2 Variables as functions of the unit defense cost c, a=b=δ=β=1, γ=2.
FIGURE 3 Utility isoquants in a growth factor γ versus discount factor δ diagram, a=b=1, c=2, β=0.6.
THE CES MODEL
To analyze the robustness of the results, let us substitute the Cobb–Douglas utilities in
equations (3) and (5) and the total utility in equation (6) with: 
keeping equations (1),(2),(4) as before, setting λ=1/2 for symmetric equilibria. Applying the 
same method of analysis as in the third section, and assuming symmetry, remarkably, gives, 
for the case of joint exchange and raiding where b > cβ2, exactly the same results for the 
Cobb–Douglas model and the CES model, independently of ξ. That is, the CES FOCs 
reproduce all the equations in equation (9) for the two periods exactly. This suggests 
exceptionally good robustness of the results. For pure raiding where b ≤ cβ2, no general 
analytical solution exists. However, it has been possible to use the CES FOCs to reproduce 
the equations in equation (10) with the assumption γ2δ + aγ = 2a2, and additionally assuming 
ξ=1/2 and b = cβ2, which gives the transition point between joint exchange and raiding, and 
pure raiding, where Xj = 0.
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FIGURE 4 Utility isoquants in a usability of appropriation β versus discount factor δ diagram, a=b=γ=1, c=2.
CONCLUSION
Although the folk theorem is generally formulated, it is often taken to imply that increasing
the shadow of the future may suppress conflict and induce cooperation. Skaperdas and
Syropoulos (1996a) demonstrate, in a model that allows production and fighting, the opposite
effect – that agents may choose conflict today to reap benefits tomorrow, so that the increased
importance of the future may harm cooperation. To broaden our insight, this article introduces
exchange endogenously as a possible strategy in addition to production, appropriation, and
defense. Exchange and raiding (appropriation and defense) have traditionally been analyzed
separately within economics, which this article intends to overcome through joint treatment.
As an example, each side to some extent looted the other in the American Civil War, although
some reciprocal exchange was conducted by ‘blockage-runners’, where the South exported
cotton and imported manufactured goods.
FIGURE 5 (b) Variables as functions of the resource ratio R11/R21, a1=a2=b1=b2=c1=c2=δ=γ=1, α=β=1/2.
FIGURE 5 (a) Variables as functions of the resource ratio R11/R21, a1=a2=b1=b2=c1=c2=δ=γ=1, α=β=1/2.
A two-period model with time dependence is analyzed. Cobb–Douglas utilities are
assumed, and the results are confirmed with CES utilities. Agents discount the future, and
there is growth from the first to the second period. Increasing the shadow of the future has four
impacts. First, it decreases appropriation and defense, and increases exchange, in the first
period. This result is the opposite of Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a) result and shows that
agents voluntarily reduce raiding and increase voluntary exchange when given that option.
Second, appropriation, defense, and exchange, in the second period increase. Third, all utilities
increase. Fourth, there is no impact on efficiency.
Increasing appropriation cost reduces appropriation and defense, and increases exchange 
and utility, in both periods. Increasing defense cost increases appropriation, and decreases 
defense, exchange, and utility, in both periods. Increasing production cost increases appropri-
ation and defense in the first period, decreases appropriation and defense in the second period, 
since fewer resources become available in the second period, and decreases exchange and 
utility in both periods. From a collective welfare point of view, increasing appropriation cost 
and decreasing defense cost and production cost is beneficial.
Appropriated goods can be less valuable to the appropriator than to the defender due to
destruction and differential preferences. No usability of appropriation gives pure exchange and
100% efficiency, and exhaustive usability of appropriation when appropriation and defense
costs are equal gives pure raiding and 50% efficiency. Increasing the usability of appropriation
increases appropriation in both periods, causes concave defense, and decreases exchange, in
both periods. Agents substitute from defense to appropriation when appropriation becomes
more usable, and utility decreases. However, as the usability of appropriation increases into
the range where exchange no longer occurs, which is possible when the defense cost exceeds
the appropriation cost, the special case of pure raiding analyzed when an analytical solution
exists reveals that the utility increases while agents find a mutual interest in constraining appro-
priation and defense. The implication is that utility isoquants in a usability of appropriation
versus discount factor diagram are concavely increasing for joint exchange and raiding, and
convexly decreasing for the special case analyzed of pure raiding.
Introducing exchange endogenously as a possible strategy, in addition to fighting, decreases
appropriation, defense, and exchange in the first relative to the second period when there is
growth, when the cost of appropriation increases, and for appropriation and defense when the
future becomes more important, in contrast to Skaperdas and Syropoulos’ (1996a) result that
increasing the shadow of the future may increase fighting. Conversely, appropriation, defense,
and exchange increase in the first relative to the second period when the cost of defense, the
cost of production, or the usability of appropriation increases.
The ratio of utilities in the first and second periods has three characteristics. First, it 
intuitively decreases in the growth factor. Second, it increases in the cost of production, 
which is more detrimental for the second period due to time dependence. Third, it 
increases in the usability of appropriation.
Exchange (trade) has increased over the centuries, caused by factors such as improved 
transport, transmission of information, preservation techniques, human rights, and education. 
A hypothesis is that exchange has increased in periods with lower usability of appropriated 
goods, when the defense was cheaper than appropriation, and when farsightedness was 
possible, increasing the shadow of the future. The development of more sophisticated tastes 
over the last millennia, and improved capacity for destruction, have likely decreased the 
usability of appropriation. The development of more lawful societies has given the 
defending parties additional resort opportunities. A population explosion has moved 
dispersed communities closer, and long-term relationships have developed. As farsightedness 
in interaction has developed, and the shadow of the future has increased, possibilities for 
exchange have emerged in addition to raiding.
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